ARBITRATION
DECISION NO.:
412
UNION:
OCSEA, Local 11, AFSCME, AFL-CIO
EMPLOYER:
Department of Taxation
Personal Property Tax Division
DATE OF
ARBITRATION:
December 10, 1991
DATE OF
DECISION:
January 13, 1992
GRIEVANT:
Timothy L. Pingle
OCB
GRIEVANCE NO.:
30-10-(91-05-21)-0259-01-14
ARBITRATOR:
Anna Smith
FOR THE
UNION:
Dane Braddy
Staff
Representative
FOR THE
EMPLOYER:
Timothy Stauffer
Advocate
Valerie Butler
Second Chair
KEY WORDS:
Removal
Just Cause
Last Chance Agreement
ARTICLES:
Article 24-Discipline
§24.01-Standard
§24.05-Imposition
of
Discipline
Article 25-Grievance Procedure
§25.08-Relevant
Witnesses
and Information
FACTS:
The grievant was
a Tax Commissioner Agent 2 who was hired in September 1988. He had received a written reprimand for
absenteeism and low performance evaluations while in his probationary
period. The grievant was assigned a new
supervisor, who had no formal supervisory training and who issued a second
verbal reprimand for absenteeism to the grievant and developed a plan to
improve the grievants performance. The
supervisor then issued a written reprimand to the grievant, also for
absenteeism. The supervisor continually
issued memos to the grievant regarding his poor performance. During this period, the grievant created a
file of his supervisor's actions, which show a denial of sick leave, lack of
assistance from management, and an adjustment of his plan goals. His performance continued to decline and he
was issued a 10 day suspension for insubordination, for which five days were
served pursuant to a last chance agreement.
It was discovered
after the last chance agreement had been made, that the grievant had not
completed taxpayers' refund requests timely, causing the taxpayers to lose
rights to their refunds, and had used abusive language toward them. These events had occurred prior to the last
chance agreement; only the discovery of these events occurred after the last
chance agreement was made. The grievant
was removed for Neglect of Duty, on May 10, 1991.
EMPLOYER’S
POSITION:
There was just
cause for the grievant's removal. As a
Tax Commissioner Agent he is guilty of Neglect of Duty because of: 1) his
failure to process claims which caused taxpayers to lose their appeal rights to
refunds, 2) failing to make tax district changes subjecting taxing districts to
revenue loss, 3) insubordination by failing to supply his supervisor with a
list of tax returns in his possession, 4) using abusive language toward a
supervisor.
The grievant's
pattern of poor performance has not been corrected by progressive discipline
including supervisory counseling, verbal and written reprimands, and
suspensions. The employer committed no
violation of section 25.08 as the union's document requests were honored.
UNION’S
POSITION:
The employer
chose to remove the grievant and took actions to ensure that such a result
would be obtained, by issuing two verbal reprimands, a written reprimand, and a
ten day suspension (reduced pursuant to a last chance agreement), in violation
of his contractual rights. The grievant
was not given proper supervision because 6 to 8 months elapsed before his
supervisor checked the refund requests the grievant needed to process. The grievant was harassed by his supervisor,
as evidenced by the memos issued to him regarding his job performance. Further evidence that the employer intended
to remove the grievant is the fact that the incidents for which he was removed
occurred prior to his ten day suspension.
The employer
impaired the union's ability to represent the grievant by failing to comply
with the union's document request. The
employer improperly used prior discipline to show progressivity as the prior
discipline was for different violations and should not be considered. Therefore, removal is not progressive nor
corrective, but punitive, and did not meet just cause.
ARBITRATOR’S
OPINION:
A last chance
agreement may bar an arbitrator from applying just cause standards to a
disciplinary decision. This is the
result if the agreement is valid. If
the agreement were made in bad faith the agreement would be set aside and just
cause would apply. The arbitrator found
that the last chance agreement was valid, therefore just cause cannot be
applied to this grievance.
The grievant's
relationship with his supervisor had deteriorated into hostility and defiance
for which both parties bear some responsibility. There is evidence that the employer stacked charges of wrongdoing
which overlapped the period prior to and after the last chance agreement. It is questionable whether the employer
afforded the grievant an opportunity to correct his performance related to
processing taxpayer claims.
Additionally, the grievant's supervisor focused on documenting the
grievant's conduct, not correcting it.
Pursuant to the
last chance agreement, the grievant has waived his right to arbitral evaluation
of the appropriateness of the penalty for any violation. Thus, the grievant's use of abusive language
toward his supervisor is sufficient grounds for removal. The grievant cannot argue disparate
treatment based upon this fact. This is
in addition to the grievant's neglect of duty for 1) his failure to process
claims which caused taxpayers to lose their appeal rights to refunds and, 2)
failing to make tax district changes subjecting taxing districts to revenue
loss. The grievant cannot place the
blame for this on the employer's failure to properly supervise him.
The employer's
actions were questionable in light of the timing and number of charges. While the taxpayer claim problems occurred
prior to the last chance agreement, they were not discovered until after, thus
the agreement was not made in bad faith.
The fact that prior discipline was based on other violations does not
support a reduced penalty, as the last chance agreement contains no
qualification as to the reason for discipline.
Lastly the grievant was not prejudiced if the employer failed to comply
with discovery, as the State made the information available later on in the
grievance procedure.
AWARD:
The grievance was
denied in part. The removal was upheld
but the grievant was awarded 4 weeks back pay due to the employer's delay in
processing the grievance.
TEXT OF
THE OPINION:
In the Matter of Arbitration
Between
STATE OF OHIO,
DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION
and
OHIO CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 11,
A.F.S.C.M.E., AFL/CIO
OPINION and AWARD
Anna D.
Smith, Arbitrator
Case
30-10-910521-0259-01-14
Timothy L.
Pingle, Grievant
Discharge
Appearances
For the State of Ohio:
Timothy
Stauffer; Ohio Department
of
Taxation; Advocate
Valerie
Butler; Ohio Office of Collective
Bargaining;
Second Chair
Robert H.
Dudgeon; Administrator,
Personal
Property Tax Division,
Ohio
Department of Taxation; Witness
Joseph
Meehan; Audit Unit Supervisor,
Ohio
Department of Taxation; Witness
Mary
Tillman; Audit Unit Supervisor,
Ohio
Department of Taxation; Witness
Rebecca
Eiselt; Ohio Department of Taxation;
Observer
Arthur M.
Suchta; Attorney, Ohio Department of Taxation;
Observer
For OCSEA Local 11, AFSCME:
Dane
Braddy; Staff Representative, OCSEA Local 11,
AFSCME,
AFL-CIO; Advocate
Timothy
Pingle; Grievant
Perry M.
Wise; Steward and Vice-President, OCSEA Local 11,
AFSCME,
AFL-CIO; Witness
Amy Toops
Sappington; Witness.
Hearing
Pursuant to the
procedures of the parties a hearing was held at 10:00 a.m. on December 10, 1991
at the Office of Collective Bargaining, Columbus, Ohio before Anna D. Smith,
Arbitrator. The parties were given a
full opportunity to present written evidence and documentation, to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, who were sworn, and to argue their respective
positions. The record was closed upon
conclusion of oral argument at 5:30 p.m., December 10, 1991. This opinion and award is based solely on
the record as described herein.
Issue
The parties were
unable to reach agreement on the issue to be resolved. The Employer contends that paragraph 2 of
the Last Chance Agreement prohibits the Arbitrator from determining just cause
for removal. (This paragraph states, "The Employee understands and agrees
that further violations of TAX work rules shall constitute just cause for
Removal.") In the Employer's view,
the issue to be decided is whether the Grievant violated any Department of
Taxation work rules and, if not, what the remedy shall be. The Union argues for a more broadly defined
issue, urging that it be whether the Grievant was removed for just cause and,
if not, what the remedy shall be. In
the face of continuing disagreement, the Arbitrator made a preliminary
determination to hear the case under the just-cause issue and to address the
Employer's objection in the written opinion.
Joint Exhibits and Stipulations
Joint
Exhibits
1. 1989-91 Collective
Bargaining Agreement
2. Grievance Trail
3. Discipline Trail
4. Training
Attendance Records
Joint
Stipulations of Fact
1. Mr. Pingle's date
of employment was September 12, 1988.
2. Mr. Pingle's date
of termination was May 10, 1991.
3. The position held
by Mr. Pingle was that of Tax Commissioner Agent 2.
4. At the time of his
removal, Mr. Pingle's record included the following prior discipline:
a. November 15, 1990
- 10-day suspension
b. July 19, 1990 -
5-day suspension
c. May 23, 1990 -
Verbal reprimand
d. April 3, 1990 - Written
reprimand
e. March 15, 1990 -
Verbal reprimand
f. August 3, 1990
[sic] - Verbal reprimand.
5. At the time of his
removal, Mr. Pingle was under a last chance agreement.
6. Mr. Pingle carried
2 years, 8 months of seniority.
Relevant Contract Provisions
Article 24
Discipline
§24.01 -
Standard
Disciplinary
action shall not be imposed upon an employee except for just cause....
§24.05 -
Imposition of Discipline
Disciplinary
measures imposed shall be reasonable and commensurate with the offense and shall
not be used solely for punishment.
Article 25
Grievance Procedure
§25.08 -
Relevant Witnesses and Information
The Union may
request specific documents, books, papers or witnesses reasonably available
from the Employer and relevant to the grievance under consideration. Such request shall not be unreasonably
denied.
Case History
The Grievant,
Timothy Pingle, was hired by the Ohio Department of Taxation on September 18,
1988 as a Tax Commissioner Agent 2 assigned to the Personal Property Tax
Division. He received the Department's
training and was on notice of its rules.
The record contains nothing particularly noteworthy about him during the
first year of his employment when he was under the supervision of Michael
Sachs. Foreshadowing future events were
an August 1989 verbal reprimand for absence without leave (Management Ex. 13)
and a performance evaluation with two "Below Expectations" ratings in
the areas of quantity of work and timeliness.
The Grievant testified he was not concerned about the ratings because
this supervisor had a reputation for being tough.
In February 1990,
the Grievant was assigned a new supervisor, Mary Tillman, who had worked for
the Department for nine years but had neither previously been a supervisor nor
had she received formal supervisory training.
The relationship between Ms. Tillman and Mr. Pingle became
troubled. On March 15, 1990, a second
verbal reprimand for tardiness was issued.
On March 19, in an attempt to improve Pingle's work performance, goals
and a plan to achieve them were agreed to (Management Ex. 4). In April, a written reprimand for tardiness
was issued. Also during this month
Tillman began writing memos to Pingle documenting non-compliance with the
agreed to plan and seeking explanations for various performance-related
problems (Management Exs. 5-8). In May,
the Grievant was relieved of certain other duties so he could spend more time
working towards his goals (Management Ex. 8, 9). Pingle, too, began to create a paper trail:
he sought an adjustment of his goals (Union Ex. 1, June 14, 1990), documented a
sick leave denial (Union Ex. 2, June 8, 1990) and unwillingness of his
supervisor to provide assistance to him (Union Ex. 5, November 2, 1990), and
protested a denial of a field audit request (Union Ex. 6, June 6, 1990). The Grievant's conduct remained troublesome
to his supervisors: in May and July he received additional discipline for
sleeping on duty (verbal reprimand) and neglect of duty, insubordination,
tardiness, falsification of documents and other infractions occurring in April
and May (5-day suspension). In
September, Tillman reviewed Pingle's performance and found it lacking in five
of seven categories, including the aforementioned timeliness and quantity.
Incidents of
August and September resulted in a 10-day suspension for insubordination,
tardiness and/or failure of good behavior.
Only five days of this suspension were served under a Last Chance
Agreement signed November 21 by which the Grievant waived his right of appeal
through the grievance procedure and agreed that "further violations of TAX
work rules shall constitute just cause for Removal" (Joint Ex. 3). This agreement was to expire May 23, 1991.
While the
Grievant was serving this suspension, it came to the Employer's attention that
a number of taxpayers had been experiencing difficulty with Mr. Pingle's
work. Specifically, Taxpayer A
telephoned to complain about the length of time it took to make a taxing
district correction. Inaction on Taxpayer
B's refund
request resulted in the tax return becoming final with the taxpayer losing the
right of appeal. Taxpayer C complained
about inaction in a refund request originally made in September 1989. Tillman began to collect documents in
support of these allegations. She also
initiated a daily appointment schedule for her subordinates by which the agents
were to sign up for an hour a day of individual assistance from her. The record (Management Ex. 10) reveals that
the agents made declining use of this program over time and its effectiveness
was challenged by the Grievant's testimony.
When the Grievant
returned from his suspension, a meeting was held to try to address the on-going
problems. Pingle was offered
retraining, but refused because he did not believe it would solve his problem. He was permitted to move his desk to be out
of the direct view of his supervisor.
He was also instructed to bring complaints he may have had about Tillman
to her superior (Management Ex. 11).
As the relationship
between Pingle and Tillman deteriorated and Pingle's behavior interfered with
the work environment, Union officers also tried to help, counseling the
Grievant on his work habits, acting as mediators and making suggestions for
addressing the problems, such as transferring Pingle to a male supervisor. These efforts were unsuccessful.
Being
dissatisfied with Pingle's explanation of his handling of Taxpayers A, B and C,
Tillman requested discipline on December 26 (Management Ex. 27). Before a pre-disciplinary meeting was held,
however, further problems surfaced: a review of Pingle's files revealed another
instance of a refund request going dead from Pingle's inaction (Taxpayer E,
Management Ex. 27); and in March, Taxpayer F called about a refund requested in
September, 1990 to which no reply had been received. Tillman added these to her discipline request (Management Ex.
27). She further documented his use of
vulgar language in an audit meeting and added this to her discipline request
(Management Ex. 41).
A
pre-disciplinary hearing notice was issued March 28, citing "Neglect of
Duty and/or Failure of Good Behavior, Insubordination and Posting or Displaying
Abusive Material or Use of Insulting Language Toward Another Employee, Taxpayer
or General Public" (Joint Ex. 3).
Tillman continued to document Pingle's behavior which she testified she
found inappropriate and threatening (Management Exs. 42, 43). The pre-disciplinary hearing was held April
10, 1991, with a removal order issued May 8, 1991, effective May 10, 1991.
A grievance was
subsequently filed protesting the removal (Joint Ex. 2), and specific documents
to prepare the Grievant's defense were requested by the Union. When these documents were not forthcoming, a
second grievance (Union Ex. 3) was filed alleging violation of the discovery
provision of the contract, Section 25.08.
This second grievance was ultimately adjusted without resort to
arbitration. The substantive matter of
Mr. Pingle's removal, however, remained at issue and so was ultimately appealed
to
arbitration, where it presently resides for final and binding resolution.
Arguments of the Parties
Argument
of the Employer
The Employer
contends that the evidence shows the Grievant was terminated for just cause
under the terms of a last chance agreement and by virtue of specific rule
infractions. The Grievant is guilty of
neglect of duty, claims the Employer, in that despite proper training his
inactions caused certain taxpayers to lose their rights of appeal in violation
of the Taxpayers' Bill of Rights, subjecting the Department to potential
damages. The Grievant's neglect of duty
is further evidenced by his excessive delay in making a tax district change,
subjecting a taxing district to revenue loss, and his excessive delay in acting
on a change in property ownership. Such
inactions erode the Department's credibility.
The Grievant was
also guilty of insubordination, says the Employer, when he failed to respond to
his supervisor's order to supply a list of all returns in his possession. When this list was finally supplied it
revealed one of the refund requests that had gone dead.
The facts also
establish that the Grievant was guilty of failure of good behavior by cursing
in the presence of his supervisor and making threatening remarks to her.
The Employer
maintains that this conduct is part of a pattern of behavior that previously
resulted in progressive, but ineffective, corrective disciplinary actions. Despite being afforded every opportunity to
improve his work product and conform his behavior to acceptable standards,
including a rejected offer of retraining and a last chance agreement, the
conduct persisted.
The Employer
urges the Arbitrator to uphold the removal, citing the force of last chance
agreements as affirmed by Arbitrator Pincus in the parties' case number
31-09-880401-0007-0106. It further
argues that the Union's claim that the Employer's actions are tainted by a
violation of §25.08 is unwarranted, since the Employer supplied requested
documents prior to arbitration as required by the Contract and the grievance on
discovery was thereupon withdrawn. The
Employer therefore seeks denial of this grievance in its entirety.
Argument
of the Union
The Union
contends that Management did not like the Grievant and thus treated him in such
a way as to violate his contractual rights and insure his dismissal. The Grievant's supervisor failed in her duty
to supervise the Grievant properly. As
a Tax Commissioner Agent 2, he needed close supervision, yet Ms. Tillman
allowed 6-8 months to go by on refund requests. The Grievant was harassed by an obsessive supervisor, as
evidenced by the many memos Tillman issued about him. He was treated disparately: not being afforded the benefits of
the Agency's tardiness policy, he was issued verbal and written
reprimands. The Union further maintains
that the Grievant was set up: the events resulting in his removal occurred
prior to the 10-day suspension and should have been known by Management
because of Tillman's mail log, but allegations of neglect of duty were not
involved in that suspension.
The Union goes on
to assert that the Grievant is not guilty of insubordination. His testimony that he supplied the requested
documentation by the end of the day went unrebutted by Management.
The Union says
that Management has interfered with its ability to defend the Grievant because
of its refusal to supply requested documents to the professional union
representative in a timely fashion. If
they could be made part of the arbitration record, no harm could have been done
in giving them to the Union advocate.
With respect to
the Grievant's prior discipline, the Union points out that different conduct
was involved, and asks that the Arbitrator separate that discipline from this.
In conclusion,
the Union points out that the Contract requires that discipline be corrective
and nonpunitive. The Grievant, it says,
was not afforded the opportunity to learn and grow from his errors, but was
given discipline for punishment. The
Union asks that the grievance be sustained, the Grievant reinstated, awarded
all back pay and benefits, and made whole.
Opinion of the Arbitrator
The Issue
The Employer
seeks a ruling on whether paragraph 2 of the Last Chance Agreement prohibits
the Arbitrator from determining just cause.
It does not if the agreement is invalid. Thus, if the agreement was made in bad faith (such as to set up
the Grievant as alleged by the Union) or if the Employer violated
its terms or if some other condition invalidates the agreement, then it must be
set aside and the removal judged on the just cause standard of the
Contract. Even Arbitrator Pincus, whose
opinion the Employer urges on this arbitrator, indicates that there are limits
to the authority of last chance agreements, saying that he "would have
closely scrutinized the open-ended status of the conditional reinstatement
document if the Grievant's activities had occurred a significant time period
beyond the original signing" (Parties' Grievance Number
13-09-880401-0007-01-06 at 20). On the
other hand, if the Last Chance Agreement is valid and the Grievant violated its
terms as argued by the Employer, then the Grievant's removal pursuant to
paragraph 2 must be upheld. As
discussed below, this agreement is held to be valid and the removal is upheld.
Merits of
the Case
The picture that
emerges from the record of this case is of an employment relationship that has
degenerated into defiance and hostility, wherein the memo became a primary
weapon of offense and defense as both sides created a record of events
supporting their own positions. The
relationship appears to be too far gone to be salvageable and, for this, both sides
bear some responsibility. There is, for
example, some evidence that permits the conclusion that the Employer stacked
incidents of wrongdoing over several months after the Last Chance Agreement was
signed. With respect to neglect of duty
in processing taxpayers' refund requests (the most egregious of the
Grievant's offenses), there is also some question as to whether any real
opportunity for rehabilitation was afforded the Grievant despite the implied
terms of the Last Chance Agreement since, upon discovering the first cases
while the Grievant was on suspension, the supervisor's focus appears to have
been on zealously documenting the Grievant's conduct rather than amending it.
However, even apart from his job performance, the Grievant's behavior remained
objectionable to the Employer after the Last Chance Agreement was signed, and
for this he must be held accountable.
One of the
several objectionable incidents involved his use of the word
"fucking" without provocation during a meeting with his supervisor on
March 13, well within the time frame of the agreement. Ordinarily, the Arbitrator would find this
insufficient cause to discharge an employee, particularly if it were shown to
be common office language or the Employer were shown to be lax in enforcing its
rule prohibiting vulgar language.
However, when the Grievant signed the Last Chance Agreement, he waived
his right to have the Arbitrator determine the appropriateness of removal as a
penalty for any rule infraction during the period November 23, 1990 and
May 23, 1991. However harsh the terms
of the agreement may seem, they were agreed to by the Grievant, and the
Arbitrator must defer. The Grievant now
says he had to sign it or be fired.
This statement makes no sense since he was negotiating a suspension, not
a removal. The Grievant may now say it
is not fair for him to be fired while others are not for using similar
language. Assuming the
claim of disparate treatment to be true, this would be a persuasive argument
were it not for the Last Chance Agreement which created a situation of
inequality by the parties' mutual consent: the Employee receives an opportunity
for rehabilitation and a penalty less than what other employees do and the
Employer receives a promise of rehabilitation and the freedom to choose the
next level of discipline for future infractions. Clearly, the Grievant chose to give up certain due process rights
when he signed the agreement and he must now live with that decision. So must he also live with the consequences
of using vulgar language toward his supervisor.
The discussion
this far has focused on the Grievant's failure of good behavior to underscore
the force of last chance agreements, but the Grievant is also guilty of a much
more serious offense that would justify discipline--perhaps discharge even
without the authority of a last chance agreement: neglect of duty in the
handling of five taxpayers' requests for amendments to their returns. That a number of these taxpayers lost their
appeal rights as a result is shocking and indefensible under the
circumstances. The Grievant may have
been "only" a two-year employee in a position that relies primarily
on on-the-job training, but the statute of limitations is not some obscure
regulation, nor does the Grievant deny knowledge of it. Instead he blames Management for not
watching him closely enough and for advising him during training that the
Department is a "tax collection agency." It is incredulous that he would take the
latter to mean that he was to let refund requests go dead rather than as an
indication of priorities. Additionally
(notwithstanding the statement of Mr. Wise, whose experience in his position as
a Tax Commissioner 5 is different from the Grievant's), the Arbitrator is
persuaded by the testimony of Management witnesses that it was reasonable and
necessary for the Department to expect a Tax Commissioner Agent 2 of the
Grievant's tenure to keep on top of the statute of limitations.
It would also be
reasonable to impose corrective disciplinary action for these offenses--even
discharge, given the number and seriousness of the offenses and the Grievant's
record. However, the Employer's conduct
in handling these infractions does give the Arbitrator some pause: the delay in
going forward with prediscipline and the multiplicity of charges, e.g. If the
Employer set up the Grievant, as argued by the Union, and thus made the Last
Chance Agreement in bad faith, that would be reason to set the agreement
aside. This position is not supported
by the facts brought forth in arbitration.
While it is true that the taxpayer problems arose prior to the 10-day
suspension and that they were absent from the charges resulting in that
suspension, nothing but supposition suggests that the Employer did not discover
the first cases while the Grievant was serving that suspension. The Employer's claim on the timing of the
discovery must be accepted. As a
result, the presumption that the Last Chance Agreement was made in good faith
and not to set up the Grievant is undisturbed.
The Union' s
argument of disparate treatment in the application of tardiness rules is also
not supported by the record. Moreover,
its plea to separate those infractions from the ones with which the Grievant is
now charged lacks merit for several reasons.
First, the Last Chance Agreement does not contain any limitations or
exceptions to the rule infractions justifying removal. Second, the concept of progressive discipline
does not mean that successive violations must necessarily be of the same rule
or even closely related. Just so, on
the face of it, it would seem that attendance is a contributing factor in the
Grievant's problems with timeliness and quantity of work product.
The Union
position on the charge of insubordination, on the other hand, must be accepted
for the reasons given, but the other infractions are sufficient to sustain the
removal.
The final issue
raised by the Union is that of discovery.
This issue was properly disposed of through the grievance procedure
without prejudice to the Grievant. Like
the Last Chance Agreement, the Arbitrator must leave that resolution
undisturbed.
Penalty
The Grievant's
conduct for the last year or so of his employment is reprehensible: he failed to respond to his Employer's
efforts to improve his productivity, was repeatedly late for work, disobeyed
orders, failed to respond appropriately to corrective discipline, neglected his
duty in handling tax return amendments, disrupted the work place, used foul
language, and intimidated his supervisor.
Termination is justified.
The Employer's
conduct is also blameworthy: the Grievant was threatened when he sought his
supervisor's assistance, as was a Union official and the labor-management
program when the Union sought to fulfill its responsibility to represent the
Grievant, and the predisciplinary process dragged for several months without
hearing while material was collected on fresh charges. Such methods of dealing with recalcitrant
employees cannot be condoned. To
encourage future Employer compliance with the essentials of fair dealing and
due process guaranteed by the Contract, the Grievant is awarded four (4) weeks
back pay commencing from the date of his removal.
Award
The grievance is
denied. The removal of Timothy Pingle
is upheld and he is awarded four (4) weeks back pay, commencing from May 11,
1991. The Arbitrator retains
jurisdiction for thirty days to resolve any dispute in the calculation of said
award.
Anna D. Smith, Ph.D.
Arbitrator
January 13, 1992
Shaker Heights, Ohio